Airbnb vs Booking.com in Kavala: What 437 Confirmed Bookings Reveal

For a short-term-rental owner, “Airbnb or Booking.com?” sounds like a simple platform question. In practice, it is a distribution question, a pricing question and a property-fit question at the same time. One channel may generate more reservations, while another produces a higher nightly rate. A platform may look dominant in total revenue because it carries more properties, not because it performs better on the same homes.

Planbnb analysed its original Hosthub export to examine how the two channels performed across managed rentals in Kavala and the surrounding area. This new reservation-level analysis compares confirmed value, booking count, nights, ADR, stay length, booking window, seasonality, year mix and the limited cancellation evidence available.

The result is not a clean victory for one platform. Booking.com is clearly the larger demand engine within this portfolio. Airbnb, however, records a higher portfolio-wide ADR and average booking value. Once the comparison is narrowed to properties with meaningful activity on both channels, much of Airbnb’s apparent rate advantage disappears. The data therefore points to different channel roles rather than one universally superior OTA.

Quick Answer

Within the Planbnb-managed portfolio, Booking.com matters more for scale: it generated 370 confirmed bookings and 82.9% of the two-channel accommodation Booking value, compared with Airbnb’s 67 bookings and 17.1%. Airbnb produced the higher portfolio-wide ADR and average booking value, but the ADR gap narrowed to less than 1% in a balanced five-property cohort. For most Kavala owners, the evidence supports using both channels strategically rather than choosing only one.

The Dataset

The source was Planbnb’s original Hosthub operational and financial export, downloaded on 6 August 2026; its latest booking-creation date is 5 August 2026. The files contain 838 matching event rows across 29 Planbnb-managed rentals in five rental groups, with check-ins from 18 May 2025 to 23 September 2026.

The export includes 761 booking records and 77 calendar holds; holds were removed because they are not guest bookings. Of the bookings, 543 were active and 218 cancelled. The core comparison uses 437 active Airbnb or Booking.com reservations, representing 2,363 nights. All monetary measures in this public report are shown as percentages, ratios or indices to protect commercially sensitive portfolio information.

Offline Booking and WordPress records were excluded from the Airbnb-versus-Booking.com calculations. They were retained only when calculating each OTA’s share of the full active portfolio. This distinction matters: Booking.com accounted for 82.9% of Booking value inside the two-channel comparison, but 67.3% of Booking value across all active portfolio channels. Airbnb accounted for 17.1% of the two-channel comparison and 13.9% of the full active portfolio.

Future confirmed stays are included. Eighty-seven of the 437 Airbnb and Booking.com reservations had check-in dates after the 6 August extraction date and represented 22.2% of the two-channel Booking value. They were confirmed pipeline at the time of export, not necessarily completed or finally realised stays. This is especially important when reading the 2026 and cancellation sections.

“Booking value” is Hosthub’s accommodation value for an active reservation; “gross reservation value” is Hosthub’s Total Value, which may include taxes or other guest-facing amounts. ADR is total Booking value divided by nights, average stay is nights divided by bookings, and booking window is creation-to-check-in days using only non-negative records.

Airbnb vs Booking.com at a Glance

MetricAirbnbBooking.com
Confirmed bookings67370
Share of confirmed bookings15.3%84.7%
Share of two-channel Booking value17.1%82.9%
Share of two-channel gross reservation value17.0%83.0%
Booked nights3691,994
Average booking value index (Booking.com = 100)114.0100.0
ADR index (Booking.com = 100)111.5100.0
Average stay5.51 nights5.39 nights
Median valid booking window24 days20 days
Payout per booked night index (Booking.com = 100)108.8100.0

KEY FINDING: Across 437 active Airbnb and Booking.com bookings analysed by Planbnb, Booking.com accounted for 82.9% of accommodation Booking value, compared with 17.1% for Airbnb.

Which Platform Generates More Revenue?

Booking.com generated almost 4.85 times Airbnb’s confirmed accommodation Booking value. Its share of the two-channel total was 82.9%, compared with Airbnb’s 17.1%, broadly matching Booking.com’s 84.7% share of confirmed bookings and 84.4% share of booked nights.

The same result appears when Hosthub’s wider Total Value field is used: Booking.com accounted for 83.0% of two-channel gross reservation value and Airbnb 17.0%. A small cancellation-fee amount appeared only on Booking.com records, but it was excluded from all confirmed-stay comparisons because cancellation accounting is not directly comparable with active accommodation value.

This establishes Booking.com as the larger revenue source, but not automatically as the better-performing platform. Most of the value gap comes from the number of Booking.com reservations and the number of properties with activity there. Booking.com had confirmed stays on 27 properties, compared with 15 for Airbnb. A channel with broader portfolio coverage should be expected to contribute more total value even if its rate per night is lower.

Hosthub’s Total Payout equalled 84.3% of gross reservation value for Booking.com and 82.7% for Airbnb. On a per-booked-night basis, Airbnb’s payout index was 108.8 when Booking.com was set to 100. These payout measures precede management fees, operating costs and taxes; they are not profit.

Which Platform Generates More Bookings?

The booking-count comparison is even more decisive than revenue. Booking.com generated 370 active reservations, while Airbnb generated 67. That is 303 additional bookings, or 452.2% more than Airbnb. Booking.com supplied 84.7% of the two-channel booking count.

Booking.com also delivered 1,994 booked nights versus 369 on Airbnb. In other words, Booking.com’s revenue lead did not come from a handful of unusually expensive reservations. It came from sustained volume across more homes and more stays.

The monthly pattern supports this interpretation. In the ten year-month combinations where both platforms had active bookings, Booking.com generated more reservations in nine. Airbnb recorded the higher ADR in nine of those same ten months. That contrast — Booking.com winning the flow of bookings while Airbnb often records the higher rate — captures the portfolio’s channel structure better than a single revenue number.

KEY FINDING: Within the Planbnb-managed portfolio, Booking.com generated 84.7% of confirmed Airbnb-and-Booking.com reservations and 84.4% of booked nights.

Average Booking Value

With Booking.com set to an average-booking-value index of 100, Airbnb scored 114.0. Airbnb’s mean was therefore 14.0% higher. At first glance, that looks like a meaningful quality advantage.

The median tells a more cautious story. Booking.com’s median booking value was 3.0% higher than Airbnb’s. At the 90th percentile, however, Airbnb’s booking value was 32.9% higher than Booking.com’s. This indicates that a relatively small number of valuable Airbnb reservations pulled up its average. The typical booking was not clearly worth more on Airbnb.

This difference between mean and median is important for owners. A platform can produce occasional large reservations without producing a consistently higher booking value across the full distribution. Within this sample, the evidence supports saying that Airbnb had the higher average, not that every Airbnb booking was more valuable.

Average Daily Rate

Using accommodation Booking value divided by booked nights, and setting Booking.com’s portfolio-wide ADR to an index of 100, Airbnb scored 111.5. Airbnb’s ADR was therefore 11.5% higher.

However, channel and property mix are intertwined. Only 14 properties had any active reservation from both platforms. Just five had at least five active bookings from each channel, and only one reached ten bookings on each. In the five-property cohort with at least five confirmed stays per platform, Airbnb’s ADR index was 100.9 when Booking.com was set to 100. The gap fell from 11.5% across the portfolio to 0.9% among more comparable properties.

This does not prove that platform has no effect on rate. Listings, pricing rules, fees, availability, cancellation policy and guest mix can all differ by channel. It does show that the headline Airbnb ADR premium should not be described as an intrinsic Airbnb advantage. Much of it reflects which Planbnb properties were active and producing bookings on each OTA.

KEY FINDING: Airbnb’s portfolio-wide ADR was 11.5% higher, but its ADR advantage narrowed to 0.9% across five properties with at least five active bookings on each platform.

Length of Stay

Average stay length was remarkably similar. Airbnb reservations averaged 5.51 nights and Booking.com reservations 5.39 nights, a difference of only 0.12 nights. The median was five nights on both platforms.

This matters because longer stays could otherwise explain a higher average booking value. Here they do not. Airbnb’s higher portfolio-wide average booking value is driven more by its rate and upper-value tail than by guests staying materially longer. Within the Planbnb-managed portfolio, neither channel can reasonably be labelled the long-stay platform.

How Far in Advance Do Guests Book?

Among records with a usable non-negative creation date, Airbnb bookings were made an average of 41.8 days before check-in, compared with 34.9 days on Booking.com. The medians were 24 and 20 days. On this filtered basis, Airbnb guests booked about four days earlier at the median and 6.9 days earlier at the mean.

This is a provisional finding. Eleven active Airbnb records and 51 active Booking.com records had a recorded creation date after check-in and were excluded. Across the complete portfolio, 79 active bookings had this problem. The export also contains a strong concentration of creation dates on 21 and 24 July 2025, consistent with a system migration or backfill. Even non-negative 2025 windows may therefore be understated.

The safe conclusion is that Airbnb shows a somewhat longer recorded booking horizon in the valid subset, but the distributions overlap and the data does not support a strong channel rule. Owners should not set materially different pricing calendars based on this export alone.

Seasonality: Does the Winner Change During the Year?

Booking.com remained the larger channel in both peak and shoulder periods, but its degree of dominance changed. For this analysis, peak season is July and August. Shoulder season is April to June and September to October. The export contains only three active Booking.com stays in November to March, too few for a useful off-season comparison.

In July and August, Booking.com supplied 85.1% of the two-channel peak-season Booking value, compared with Airbnb’s 14.9%. Setting Booking.com’s peak ADR to 100 gives Airbnb an index of 110.9, equivalent to a 10.9% premium.

During the shoulder months, Booking.com still led, but its share fell to 76.2%, while Airbnb’s share rose to 23.8%. Airbnb’s shoulder-season average booking value was 39.5% higher than Booking.com’s. Airbnb also had a longer average shoulder stay, 6.04 nights versus 5.15, and an ADR index of 118.8 when Booking.com was set to 100.

The Airbnb shoulder sample contains only 23 active reservations, so it should not be treated as a permanent market law. It is nevertheless strategically relevant: Airbnb contributed a more meaningful share outside the July-August peak than it did during the peak itself.

KEY FINDING: Airbnb’s share of two-channel Booking value increased from 14.9% in July-August to 23.8% in the shoulder months, although Booking.com remained the larger channel in both periods.

2025 vs 2026

At face value, Booking.com grew much faster. It moved from 137 active bookings for 2025 check-ins to 233 for 2026 check-ins in the export. That is an apparent increase of 70.1% in bookings and 82.7% in Booking value.

Airbnb moved from 32 active bookings for 2025 check-ins to 35 for 2026, an apparent booking increase of 9.4% and Booking value increase of 7.0%. Airbnb ADR rose 10.0%, while Booking.com ADR rose 5.5%.

Those figures cannot be read as clean year-on-year channel growth. Booking.com had active stays on 16 properties in 2025 and 27 in 2026. Eleven properties with no active Booking.com stay in the 2025 records contributed 43.3% of Booking.com’s 2026 Booking value. Across the 16 properties with active Booking.com records in both years, Booking value increased only 3.6% and booking count declined 3.6%.

Airbnb had 12 active properties in each year, but the membership changed. Three properties appearing as new to the 2026 Airbnb cohort contributed 16.3% of its 2026 value. Across the nine properties active on Airbnb in both years, Booking value was effectively flat, down 0.1%, while bookings rose 15.4%.

The 2026 export also includes confirmed stays after 6 August, especially on Booking.com, and it could not include reservations made after extraction. The correct language is “booked position in the export,” not final 2026 performance. The most defensible interpretation is that Booking.com expanded strongly across Planbnb’s wider property footprint; the data does not prove equivalent like-for-like growth on established homes.

What the Numbers Actually Tell Us

Booking.com is the portfolio’s reach and conversion engine. It is active across more properties, produces far more reservations and captures the great majority of booked nights. An owner who ignores it may be giving up a large part of the demand available to Planbnb-managed homes.

Airbnb’s role is different. It produces fewer bookings, but the portfolio-wide bookings have a higher mean value, higher ADR and higher payout per occupied night. Some of that advantage comes from a high-value tail and the selection of properties operating on Airbnb. When the homes are more comparable, rates converge. Airbnb should therefore be viewed as a complementary source of demand with occasional high-value contribution, not automatically as a premium-rate machine.

Cancellation records add a risk signal, but not a final verdict. In a conservative cohort covering records with check-in from 1 August 2025 and checkout by 6 August 2026, 102 of 305 Booking.com records were cancelled, an observed share of 33.4%. Airbnb recorded seven cancellations among 47 records, or 14.9%. The export has no cancellation timestamp, the early historical period appears incomplete and future bookings can change status. These figures are informative for internal risk management, but they should not be presented as proof that the platform itself causes cancellations.

Most importantly, the comparison is observational. Channel choice is entangled with property onboarding, listing availability, minimum stays, price rules, property quality, guest preferences and management decisions. Correlation is not causation.

What This Means for Property Owners in Kavala

The first lesson is to judge channels by role, not one league table. Booking.com’s scale helps fill calendars and reach demand. Airbnb can add rate diversity and valuable reservations when a property fits its audience. Owners need both volume and revenue quality.

The second lesson is to compare a property against itself. Portfolio averages are distorted when one platform carries different homes or more available dates. An owner dashboard should compare bookings, value, ADR, payout per night, cancellation exposure and lead time over the same sellable dates.

The third lesson is seasonal. Booking.com is especially important during the July-August volume peak in this dataset, but Airbnb’s relative contribution increases in the shoulder months. Owners should maintain strong content, availability and pricing on both platforms beyond the summer peak rather than treating one OTA as a seasonal afterthought.

Why Planbnb Uses Multiple Booking Channels

A multi-channel strategy is not about copying the same listing everywhere and waiting. It is about matching distribution to the home and season while keeping calendars, prices, restrictions and guest communication coordinated. The data shows why that matters: Booking.com supplies scale, Airbnb contributes a different value profile, and offline or direct bookings account for another 18.8% of active portfolio Booking value outside this two-channel comparison.

Relying on one platform would concentrate demand risk and reduce the number of ways a property can be discovered. It could also hide property-specific opportunities. The correct operating question is not “Which logo wins?” but “Which channel mix produces the best confirmed value, payout and booking quality for this home during this period?”

Limitations of This Analysis

This report describes the Planbnb-managed portfolio, not the entire Kavala short-term-rental market. It should not be used to estimate market share, citywide ADR or the performance of an unmanaged property.

The samples are unequal: 370 active Booking.com reservations and 67 Airbnb reservations. Booking.com had activity on 27 properties and Airbnb on 15. Only five properties had at least five active bookings from each channel. Property mix, activation and onboarding influence the averages.

The years are not complete, equal cohorts. The 2026 records include future stays, omit bookings created after 6 August and reflect a changed property mix.

The export lacks validated location, property type, capacity, amenities and channel-activation dates. Property-name clues were not used to invent them, so location and type comparisons are unavailable.

Booking-window results exclude negative values and remain affected by an apparent July 2025 backfill. Cancellation dates are absent, early history is incomplete and future stays may still cancel, so both metrics carry explicit cohort limits.

Occupancy and RevPAR require daily sellable inventory, which is absent. Total Payout is not profitability because expenses and owner taxes are missing. No conclusion should be interpreted as causal.

Conclusion

If a Kavala owner asks which platform matters more, the answer from this Planbnb portfolio is Booking.com for scale and Airbnb as a complementary value channel. Booking.com generated more than five times as many confirmed bookings and 82.9% of two-channel accommodation Booking value. Airbnb delivered higher portfolio-wide ADR and average booking value, but much of the rate difference disappeared when the property cohort was balanced.

That is not a draw; it is a clearer strategic answer. Booking.com currently drives the bulk of reservation flow. Airbnb still matters because it broadens distribution, contributes high-value stays and becomes relatively more important in the shoulder period. The strongest owner strategy is to measure both on the same property, over the same dates, and manage each channel for the role it actually performs.

KEY FINDING: Within the Planbnb-managed portfolio, Booking.com is the demand engine, while Airbnb is a complementary channel whose apparent rate advantage depends heavily on property mix.

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Founder of Planbnb in Kavala, Greece. Writing about short-term rental management, hospitality and the local vacation-rental market.
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